Abstract: Network forensics is an important extension to present security infrastructure, and is becoming the research focus of forensic investigators and network security researchers. However many challenges still exist in conducting network forensics: The sheer amount of data generated by the network; the comprehensibility of evidences extracted from collected data; the efficiency of evidence analysis methods, etc. Against above challenges, by taking the advantage of both the great learning capability and the comprehensibility of the analyzed results of decision tree technology and fuzzy logic, the researcher develops a fuzzy decision tree based network forensics system to aid an investigator in analyzing computer crime in network environments and automatically extract digital evidence. At the end of the paper, the experimental comparison results between our proposed method and other popular methods are presented. Experimental results show that the system can classify most kinds of events (91.16% correct classification rate on average), provide analyzed and comprehensible information for a forensic expert and automate or semi-automate the process of forensic analysis.
Introduction
With the fast development and growth in networking connectivity, complexity and activity, there has been an increase in the number of crimes committed within networks. This is forcing both enterprises and law enforcement to undertake highly specialized investigations. Network forensics is the act of capturing, recording and analyzing network audit trails in order to discover the source of security breaches or other information assurance problems [1] .
The biggest challenge in conducting network forensics is the sheer amount of data generated by the network.
Besides this, the comprehensibility of the process of analyzing evidences that are extracted from collected data is also an important aspect for forensic experts. Therefore, the investigators need the aid of an effective, comprehensible and automated analyzing system for network intrusion forensics. In this paper, we propose a fuzzy decision tree based system for network intrusion forensics that can detect and analyze efficiently computer crime in networked environments, and locate digital evidences automatically.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 discusses the related work such as network forensics and fuzzy decision tree system. Section 3 describes the proposed Fuzzy Decision Tree based system for network forensics. Section 4 explains the experimental data which is used in this paper and shows the experimental results. Finally, a discussion of conclusion and further issues in network forensics are given in Section 5.
Related Work

Network forensics
The term network forensics was introduced by the computer security expert Marcus Ranum in the early 90's [2] , and is borrowed from the legal and criminology field where "forensics" pertains to the investigation of crimes.
Network forensic systems are designed to identify unauthorized use, misuse, and attacks on information. Usually, network forensics which is based on audit trails is difficult and time-consuming process. Recently artificial intelligence technologies, such as artificial neural network (ANN) and support vector machine (SVM) [1] , were developed to extract significant features for network forensics to automate and simplify the process. These techniques are effective in reducing the computing-time and increasing the intrusion detection accuracy to a certain extent, but they are limited in forensic analysis. Particularly, these systems are complex, and the results produced by these methods lack enough comprehensibility. Besides these, an evidence graph-based analysis method has been proposed [3] , and although it is nice to present evidence correlation in graphic mode, this system is still a prototype and lacks the effective capability of inference. Finally, a fuzzy expert system has also been proposed for network forensics [4] , but it still asks for experts to build a knowledge base and it lacks the capability of self-learning. The fuzzy decision tree-based forensic system proposed in this paper can effectively solve the above problems while keeping better analytical result.
Fuzzy decision tree
Decision trees were popularized by Quinlan with the ID3 program [5] . ID3 is based on the Concept Learning System algorithm. ID3 works by searching through the attributes of the training instances {E|e 1 ,e 2 ,…,e i ,…,e N } (where N=number of possible training samples) and extracting the attribute from attribute set {A|a 1 ,a 2 ,…,a j ,…,a M } (where M=number of possible values of an attribute) that best separates the given examples. The algorithm uses a greedy search to choose the best attribute and never looks back to reconsider earlier choices. We need to note that ID3 algorithm usually work well in symbolic domains, but does not work in a numerical decision. An extension of ID3 is the C4.5 and C5.0 algorithms, which extend the domain of classification from categorical attributes to 刘在强 等:一种用于网络取证分析的模糊决策树推理方法 2637 numeric ones. Although decision tree technologies have already been shown to be interpretable, efficient, problem independent and able to treat large scale applications, they are also recognized as highly unstable classifiers with respect to minor perturbations in the training data, in other words, methods presenting high variance. Fuzzy logic brings in an improved in these aspects due to the elasticity of fuzzy set formalism. Fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic allow the modeling of language-related uncertainties, while providing a symbolic framework for knowledge comprehensibility [6] . Up to date, many algorithms have merged fuzzy representation, with its approximate reasoning capabilities, and symbolic decision trees while preserving advantages of both: uncertainty handling and gradual processing of the former with the comprehensibility, popularity, and ease of application of the latter [7, 8] . It will further increase the representative power and applicability of decision trees by amending them with an additional knowledge component based on fuzzy representation.
Fuzzy Decision Tree-Based Network Forensic System
We develop a network forensic system based on fuzzy decision tree technology (NFSFDT). NFSFDT consists of the following components: Traffic Capturer, Feature Extractor, Forensic Analyzer. Figure 1 shows the architecture of the proposed system. The following sections detail the components respectively. 
Traffic capturer
The Traffic Capturer component is responsible for network traffic capture and preparation for traffic analysis.
The process of traffic capture is the first step of the proposed forensic system. While the capturing function is simple and straightforward, it provides the base information for other components of the forensic system. Currently the traffic capturer is based on the well-known packet capture program-TcpDump [9] . duration and the volume of data passed in each direction. The JAM Project found that combining temporal information with connection log significantly increased accuracy [10] . Usually temporal information is determined by calculating the average value of a feature (attribute), or by calculating the accumulated count of connections over a time window (such as ∆t seconds) or n connections. The Feature Extractor extracts 41 different features in all consisting of connection logs and other calculating features. For more detail information about feature selection, please refer to Refs. [10, 11] .
Fuzzy evidence analyzer
The Fuzzy Evidence Analyzer component is the core component of NFSFDT including three sub-components:
Fuzzy Preprocessor, Fuzzy Rule Bases, and Fuzzy Decision Maker. The following sections detail the above sub-components individually.
Fuzzy preprocessor
There exist two different kinds of domains for features extracted by the Feature Extractor: continuous and discrete (such as service type: tcp, udp, icmp). Each input variable's sharp (crisp) value needs to be first fuzzified into linguistic values before the Fuzzy Decision-maker processes them with the Rule Base. Unlike classical sets, a fuzzy set expresses the degree to which an element belongs to a set. The characteristic function of a fuzzy set is assigned to values between 0 and 1, which denotes the degree of membership of an element in a given set.
The Fuzzy Preprocessor uses two different ways to fuzzify the continuous and the discrete respectively. For the discrete features, the Fuzzy Preprocessor component uses the same technique as the classical set. For example, let protocol_type={tcp,udp,icmp} be the set of protocol type, then the membership function of each protocol type can be expressed as follows
where x∈{tcp,udp,icmp}, type is a fuzzy set. Besides protocol_type feature, there are others discrete features (such as service type, flag, etc.), which use the same fuzzifying method.
For continuous features, we choose the trapezoidal function as their membership function. The trapezoidal set is very popular in fuzzy theory due to its computational and storage efficiency, and more important, it is interpretable and comprehensible. A trapezoidal membership function is specified by four parameters {A n ,B n ,C n ,D n } as follows
where µ n (x) represents the membership function of the n-th fuzzy subset. Note that: if B n =C n in the above formula, then µ n (x) will become a triangle membership function (see µ 2 (x) in Figure 2 ). Fig.2 presents the fuzzy subsets of the universe of discourse num_failed_logins (a feature denoting the number of failed login attempts). Using membership functions defined for each fuzzy set of each linguistic variable, the degree of membership of a sharp feature value in each fuzzy set is determined. Step 1: If an attribute a (j) is continuous, then sort the training sample in ascending order according to the value of the attribute.
Step 2: Preprocess the values of the attribute a (j) in case the large value overwhelms the small one. For each attribute a (j) do the following condition calculation: If , then , (0<i≤N).
Note: here denotes the value of a
(j) before being fuzzified; Γ denotes a positive integer, such as 10000.
Step 3: Search the candidate cut points of a (j) . For each continuous attribute a (j) do the following condition calculation: If , and , then be used as a candidate cut point. Note: There is no candidate cut point between adjoining data with equal attribute values and different
Step 4: Calculate the membership functions of each continuous attribute (a (j) ). Calculation of the membership function is equal to the calculated values of the parameters {A n ,B n ,C n ,D n } (see Fig.2) . The values and their ranges {A n ,B n ,C n ,D n } are described in Fig.3 .
where 0≤λ≤(1/2) and Median(µ n ) is the median of the set . Fig.3 Calculating the membership functions of continuous attributes
In Step 3, we sometimes need to incorporate two or more adjoining cut points into a new one in case of getting too many fuzzy sets in step 4. Currently the system requires the intervention of a security expert to solve the problem.
Fuzzy rule bases
Fuzzy Rule Bases store the rules which are used by the Fuzzy Decision Makers to obtain a new fact. The process of building fuzzy rule bases is also the process of building fuzzy decision trees. For improving the efficiency of the decision-making and comprehensibility, we build an independent fuzzy subtree for each kind of service type respectively. The following is the process of building the fuzzy decision tree:
Step 1: Assume all the training samples {E|e 1 ,e 2 ,…,e i ,…,e N } (N denotes the count of training samples) with each sample based on its attributes as classified into C fuzzy subsets {ψ 1 ,ψ 2 ,ψ 3 ,…,ψ C }. Choose the service type attribute as the root node, and generate sub-tree {T|t 1 ,t 2 ,…,t K } roots (K denotes the count of service type).
Step 2: Calculate the cut points and membership functions of a (j) using the method in the Fuzzy Preprocessor section under the sub-tree t i .
Step 3: Calculate the fuzzy entropy of the chosen attribute a (j) for a subset . And |•| denotes the cardinality of a fuzzy set.
Step 4: Choose the attribute t to split the instances at a given node.
where attr〈•〉 is a function which returns the value of the index(j) for which IE (j) (Information Entropy) is the smallest.
Step 5: Repeat Step 2 through Step 4 until:
There are no more attributes for classification, or
All data belongs to the same class, or
The proportion of a data set of a class C k is greater than or equal to a given threshold, or
The number of elements in a data set is less than a given threshold
Step 6: Build next sub-tree t i+1 until all the K sub-trees are built.
After building the fuzzy decision tree, we can use the fuzzy decision tree to deduce the facts. The next section 刘在强 等:一种用于网络取证分析的模糊决策树推理方法 2641 explains how to infer based on facts (test samples).
Fuzzy decision maker
The Fuzzy Decision Maker functions as a fuzzy inference engine. There are two main steps in the decision-making process of NFSFDT: Choose the fuzzy rule from the sub-base according to the service type; infer the type of network event based on the chosen fuzzy rule.
We use independent components to finish each of the two steps respectively. The Fuzzy Decision Maker consists of two units: Chooser and Inferencing-Maker. The Chooser receives the processed value by the Fuzzy Preprocessor component, and chooses the fuzzy rule sub-base in Fuzzy Rule Base according to the service type of the current network session. There are at lease two aspects of the benefits to categorizing the rule base according to service type: First, improving the efficiency of the process of decision-making by using the rule sub-base rather than the whole rule base to make decision; Second, improving the extensibility of the system.
The Inferencing-Maker is the inferencing component of the NFSFDT system. To decide the classification assigned to a test sample, we have to find "leaves" from the fuzzy decision tree (that is, the Fuzzy Rule Base) whose restrictions are satisfied by the sample, and combine their decisions into a single sharp response. Such decisions are very likely to cause conflicts. These conflicts are easy to find in the following conditions: In a single leaf (non-unique classifications of its examples), or across different leaves (different satisfied leaves have different examples, possibly with conflicting classifications) [7] . So we need to provide additional methods to guarantee true decision-making under these conditions. For simplicity the Inferencing-Maker uses the Maximum method. The decision function is defined as: 〉 is the maximum; Path is a matched path of a test sample (a fact) and set(path) is the set of matched paths of the test sample.
For example, assume Fig.4 is a fuzzy decision tree and a test sample ts satisfies both path P1 and path P2, where P1={a (1) ,a (2) ,a (5) ,L1} and P2={a (1) ,a (2) ,a (3) ,L2} are paths from root node a (1) to leaves L1 and L2 respectively, ψ 1 and ψ 2 are target classes, and set(Path)={P1,P2}, C=2. Note: As for the details of the Evidence Documentor, we will discuss this in another paper.
Experiment and Result
The data for our experiments was prepared by the 1998 DARPA intrusion detection evaluation program from MIT Lincoln Labs [13] . The following experiment is based on the 10% train data subset with 494,021 data records.
Each record has 41 attributes for each connection plus one class label. In order to make the results even more comprehensible, we categorize the target into five different classes {R2L, DOS, Probe U2R, Normal} rather than the usual two classes {Normal, Abnormal}. R2L denotes unauthorized access from a remote machine, such as guessing a password; DOS denotes denial-of-service, such as smurf attack; U2R denotes unauthorized access to local superuser privileges, such as various "buffer overflow" attacks; "Probe" denotes surveillance and other probing, such as host or port scanning [10] .
There are several ways to evaluate the performance and efficiency of a classifier. Usually TP Rate (True Positive Rate) and FP Rate (False Positive Rate) are employed. In our experiment we also use RECALL and PRECISION measures to characterize the performance of the NFSFDT system
RECALL=TP, FP TP
Cross validation is a popular method of model evaluation, and in all our experiments we use 5-fold cross validation. The data set is divided into 5 subsets, and the following method is repeated 5 times. Each time, one of the 5 subsets is used as the test set and the other 4 subsets are put together to form a training set. Then the average error across all 5 trials is computed. Table 1 shows the result of the NFSFDT using the dataset with different measures. From Table 1 , we can see that the NFSFDT has good performance, and a correctly classified instance rate that reaches 91.16% on average. But the system failed to classify "spy attack" which belongs to R2L type due to the lack of training samples (only 2 spy samples exists in the dataset). The experiment results also prove that the performance of the NFSFDT still depends on the quality of train samples to some degree just like other classifiers. In order to verify the performance, we employ some popular data mining algorithms (Naive Bayes algorithm [14] , SMO algorithm [15] , Decision The experimental results are illustrated in Figs.5 and 6. Figure 5 shows the results comparing the TP rate, while 
Conclusion
In this paper, we developed an automated network intrusion forensic system (NFSFDT), which can produce interpretable and accurate results for forensic experts by applying a fuzzy logic based decision tree data mining system. The main characteristics of the NFSFDT consist of three aspects: making the output results of the NFSFDT easier to understand by using the fuzzy decision tree technology; improving the efficiency of the forensic analysis using automatic fuzzy inference; making the system parallel by building sub-trees based on network service type.
The proposed method overmatches the existing methods [1, 3, 4] at least in one aspect. The experiments also proved that the system has the potential for automating the process of network forensic analysis.
Our future work plan is to develop and implement a parallel network forensic analysis algorithm based on fuzzy decision trees which can build global and even more accurate classifiers with distributed data sets for forensic investigators.
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